Social Programs and Political Styles of Minneapolis Indians: An Interim Report. by Harkins, Arthur M. & Woods, Richard G.
CURA 
RESOURCE COLLECTION 
t TRAINING CENTER for Community Programs 
in coordination with the Office of Community Programs, 
Center for Urban and Regional Affairs 
Ml013 
THE SOCIAL PROGRAMS AND POLITICAL STYLES 
OF MINNEAPOLIS INDIANS: 
AN INTERIM REPORT 
University of Minnesota 
.. 
' 
THE SOCIAL PROGRAMS AND POLITICAL STYLES 
OF MINNEAPOLIS INDIANS: 
AN INTERIM REPORT 
' 
THE SOCIAL PROGRAMS AND POLITICAL STYLES 
OF MINNEAPOLIS INDIANS: 
AN INTERIM REPORT 
by 
Arthur M. Harkins 
and 
Richard G. Woods 
Training Center for 
Community Programs 
in coordination with 
Office of Community Programs 
Center for Urban and Regional Affairs 




Minneapolis -- The Physical and Social Environment •• 
Anti-Poverty Programs and Minneapolis Indians. 
The New Urban Chiefs ••••••••• 
Responses of Chiefs to Indian Programs • 
Control of the Indian Image 
Agency Treatment by Urban Chiefs • 
Control of the Indian 
Footnotes 
. . 1 
• • 4 
.16 




Minneapolis -- The Physical and Social Environment 
This report deals with the urban adaptation styles of Indians 
in Minneapolis. Lts foci are the program approach to social chanRe, the 
setting in which change programs occur, and the styles of participation 
and leadership that Indians and whites exhibit in this change context. 
Minneapolis is chosen rather than 'Minneapolis and St. Paul, 
because the two Indian populations seem to function somewhat separately, 
because the St. Paul Indian population is considerably smaller than the 
one in Minneapolis, and because the level of activity involving Indians 
in Minneapolis in most respects is much higher. Although Minneapolis 
Indians are our focus, the "Twin Cities" constitute the lari:~er physical 
and social setting for urban Indian life in southern Minnesota, and 
deserve some description at this point. 
The Twin Cities lie in the southeast portion of the state and 
at the uppermost navigation point of the Mississippi River. The river 
flows from west to east through north Minneapolis, then turns south to 
form part of the boundary between the two cities, an<l turns east again 
through the southern section of St. Paul. The two cities occupy a physical 
setting which has unusually great physical variety, including lakes, 
streams, abundant farmlands and wooded areas. There is a variety in the 
weather as well, with distinct differences between seasons. Winters are 
relatively severe with the first fall freeze occurring usually very early 
in October and the last spring freeze typically about the first of May. 
Winter snowfall averages between forty and fifty inches and, on the 
average,- there are from ninety to one hundred <lays with snow cover of one 
inch or more. January produces the lowest average monthly temperature: 
14°. Summers are pleasant with average mean daily temperature (June --
August) of 70°. 1 
The Twin Cities metropolitan area constitutes a transportation, 
conm1ercial, recreational and cultural focal point not only for "Minnesota 
but also for a much larger region, commonly ref erred to as the 1'Upper 
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Midwest1'. The circulation system from western rusconsin to central 
Montana, from the Canaclian border to southeastern South Dakota and 
'l 
northern Iowa is dominated by the Twin Cities."· Hinneapolis and St. Paul 
are served by seven passenger airlines, nine railways and over one 
hundred truck lines. Truck and rail volume ranks third nationally. The 
navip,able part of the Mississippi River extends into the center of 
Minneapolis, and the city is headquarters for five barge lines, trans-
porting coal, oil, shale, grain and steel. Three inter-city and six 
intra-city bus lines serve Minneapolis. 3 
Home for about thirteen hundred manufacturing establishments, 
approximately seventeen hundred wholesale businesses, ann about four 
thousand retail stores, Minneapolis also is headquarters for the ninth 
Federal Reserve District. The current employment configuration reveals 
non-agricultural employees in a wide variety of manufacturing anrl non-
manufacturing industrial categories with almost four-fifths of the total 
employment occurring in non-manufacturinR, especially retail and wholesale 
trade; finance, insurance and real estate~ service anq miscellaneous~ and 
4 federal, state and local government. 
Unemployment for the Twin Citites metro~olitan area is relatively 
low, with current monthly rates falling arounrl the two percent mark. 5 
A characteristic of private industry in the area seems to be 
that no one manufacturer or single industry dominates. In 1967 the area's 
two largest firms employed only four percent of the total employment and 
the eighty-five largest had only thirty percent of the total. 6 ~ajor 
industries include machinery, electronics, food. processing anrl products, 
textiles and apparel, printinp; and publishing, and primary and fabricated 
metals. 7 
Minneapolis is noted for its viP,orous pursuit of the arts, both 
classical and contemporary. The city supports two art museums the 
Minneapolis Institute of Arts and the Walker Art Center -- and it is the 




numerous amateur and professional theaters, including the well-known 
Tyrone Guthrie Repertory Theater, which began operations in 1963. The 
Minnesota Dance Theater and the Center Opera Company are two recent 
additions to the oultural fabric of the city. Besides housing the 
Minnesota Orchestra in its Northrop Auditorium, the University of 
Minnesota is the site for the Office of Advanced Drama Research. Each 
spring, the Metropolitan Opera presents selections from its repertory 
at Northrop Auditorium, and visiting artists, ensembles and plays are 
presented through the University's Artists Course and the Theater Guild. 
Visitors to Minneapolis from the state and 'from the Upper Midwest region 
often are attracted by cultural events, and several cultural organizations 
in the city regularly export productions to towns in the region. 
Besides the standard recreational activities found in many 
metropolitan areas, the Twin Cities are the home of the Minnesota Twins 
of the American Baseball League and the Minnesota Vikings of the National 
Football League. The Minnesota North Stars in the National Hockey League 
began play in 1967. The University of Minnesota Gophers provide Big Ten 
football games for the sports spectator, and all other major college 
sports are presented throughout the year at the University. 
Ce.ntral to the recreational life of Minneapolis is its unusual 
system of lakes and parks. Within the city are one hundred and fifty-two 
parks covering five thousand and five hundred acres and including twenty-
two lakes. Based upon a 1965 population estimate of 489,000, the park 
system provides one acre of park land for every eighty-eight Minneapoli-
8 tans. A network of parkways and boulevards enables the motorist to circle 
the city completely, driving through the principal parks and around many 
of the lakes. Sailing, swimming, fishing, water skiing, canoeing, ice 
skating and ice fishing are all possible within the city because of the 
park system. Golf, tennis, horseback riding, bowling and softball are 
among the other sports which may be pursued. Hunting and fishing in the 
countryside surrounding Minneapolis are major attractions for sportsmen. 
The mayor-council form of government is used in Minneapolis, with 
a city council as the chief governing body and a mayor, elected for a two-
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year term, and limited to a few executive powers, including control of the 
police department. The council is composed of thirteen aldermen, one from 
each of the city's voting wards. Each alderman is elected to serve for 
two years. Another feature of local government, which is of importance to 
members of minority groups, is the twenty-one member Minneapolis Commission 
on Human Relations. The Commission oversees the operation of a City 
Department of Civil Rights, which has a Director appointed by the Mayor. 
The Civil Rights Department is charged with public education and community 
mobilization on civil rights matters and with enforcing the city's civil 
rights ordinance, which bars discrimination in housing, employment, 
education, public accommodations, and public services. 
A recent study rates the "quality of life" in Minnesota quite 
high. In 1967 all fifty states were measured in a social, economic, and 
political study conducted by Dr. John O. Wilson of the Midwest Research 
Institute in Kansas City. As criteria for the rankings, Wilson chose the 
goals established by the Eisenhower Commission on National Goals: status 
of the individual, individual equality, democratic process, education, 
economic growth, technological change, agriculture, living conditions, and 
health and welfare. To measure a state's progress toward achieving these 
goals, Wilson selected ninety-one separate indicators, then ranked each 
state within each goal area. The final ranking, termed the Social-Economic-
Political (SEP) index, results from averaging each state's ranking in each 
goal area. As a result of Wilson's SEP study, Minnesota was accorded·trre· 
number two ranking among all states, after California. 9 
Anti-Poverty Programs and Minneapolis Indians 
Perhaps because of the obvious high quality of life in Minnesota, 
the spectre of inner-city poverty in Minneapolis is difficult for many 
citizens to accept. According to the 1960 census, 13.9% of the families 
in Minneapolis had incomes under three thousand dollars. Since then, 
numerous Indian families have migrated to Minneapolis, and several studies 
of Indian family income and Indian relief recipients confirm the common 
observation that Minneapolis Indians tend to inhabit the most deteriorated 
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housing in the city's poverty "target areas", and reflect a grossly 
inadequate level of income. 10 
Hennepin County Mobilization of Economic Resources (MOER) is the 
local community-action agency required under the 1964 Economic Opportunity 
Act to receive and administer anti-poverty funds from the Office of 
Economic Opportunity. It is governed by a board of residents of poverty 
areas (including Indians), public officials, representatives of private 
welfare agencies, and at-large members. Besides a program development 
staff, MOER supervises the Citizens' Community Centers, four agencies for 
social service and community organization in poverty neighborhoods. One 
of these centers, located on the south side of Minneapolis, is exclusively 
Indian. MOER provides partial or total funding for the Pilot City Center, 
·the Legal Services Program of the Legal Aid Society, the Concentrated 
Employment Program, Head Start, Neighborhood Youth Corps (both In School 
and Out of School), New Careers, the Parent and Child Development Center, 
Twin Cities Opportunities Industrialization Center, Project STAIRS, the 
Southside American Indian Youth Center, and the North Side American Indian 
Teen Center (through Pilot City Center). 
Additional comments about specific anti-poverty projects may 
be helpful. 
Pilot City Center is a federally-funded center designed to 
coordinate all the social services in an area of more than fifty thousand 
people on the north side of the city and to propose and coordinate whatever 
new services· are needed. Funding has been secured from the U.S. Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the U. S. Department of Labor .- · · 
(USDL), and the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 
addition to the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The Center is 
governed by a board of resident representatives, and Indian staff members 
are employed to help serve Indian residents. 
Twin Cities Opportunities Industrialization Center is a predomi-
nantly black-staffed and black-directed agency operating a free prevoca-
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tional "feeder" program and free vocational training programs for dis-
advantaged persons. Funds have been obtained from OEO, HEW, USDL and 
private donations. Indian staff members function in counseling, recruiting, 
instructional and clerical positions. In the past, the agency has had some 
trouble in maintaining enrollment of Indian trainees. 11 
Model City is a five-year program to revitalize an area of over 
five hundred blocks with nearly sixty thousand residents in the south 
central section of Minneapolis, where a majority of Minneapolis Indians 
live. A one hundred-member Policy and Planning Committee with sixty 
elected neighborhood members is the chief mechanism for ensuring that the 
residents themselves play a major role in deciding how they want the area 
revitalized. The City Council has ultimate authority to approve the plans. 
Current funding is from HUD and HEW. The federal government gives priority 
to requests for federally-funded projects in the Model City area in Minne-
apolis and in seventy-four other cities designated under the Demonstration 
Cities Act. In addition, the cities will receive a bonus from the federal 
government equal to eighty percent of whatever money the city provides to 
match federal spending in the area, providing that the bonus is used for 
additional new projects in the Model City area. At the time of this writing, 
planning efforts had just been completed, and major funding had not yet 
occurred. 
The Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) is a program attempting 
to bring together in one place all the elements for a manpower program for 
almost one hundred fifty thousand persons in the south and east side poverty 
areas of Minneapolis. The USDL provides funding through MOER. Administra-· 
tion of the program recently was placed in the hands of the Minnesota State 
Employment Service. For unemployed and under-employed persons, the program 
includes such features as recruitment, intake, orientation, counseling, 
education, medical and social supportive services, job development, place-
ment and follow-up. Controversy affecting the program has centered around 
charges by Indians that blacks have discriminated against Indians in the 
organization. 
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The Youth Opportunity Center is a division of the Minnesota 
State Employment Service which provides testing, counseling and placement 
in jobs or training for youths aged sixteen through twenty-one. Funding 
is through the USDL. 
The Minneapolis Public Schools operate several programs dealing 
with problems of race and poverty. Its Human Relations Center, operating 
with funds from the U. S. Office of Education (USOE), plans for curriculum 
changes and community involvement and staffs human relations training to 
improved human relations in the schools. Its Urban Affairs Division, 
funded through the school board, attempts to maintain a direct relationship 
with teachers, administration, community agencies and parents in order to 
facilitate action on urban problems. The Division developed the system's 
human relations guidelines and is responsible for implementing them. The 
Teacher Aide Program provides several hundred aides, including Indians, to 
serve in elementary and secondary schools, mostly in their own neighborhoods. 
Funding is from the Elementary and Secondary Education Act under USOE and 
the New Careers Program under OEO. The School Lunch Program seeks to 
provide adequate nutrition for children of low-income families. USOE 
provides:the funding. The Lincoln Learning Center is an experimental·store-
front junior high school established to find more effective means for 
meeting the educational needs of potential dropouts. Experimentation with 
organization of the school day, team teaching, intensified school-home 
relationships, new materials, and new approaches to instruction are the 
main methods. Funding is from USOE and the Minnesota State·Department of 
Education. 
Prominent among the private agencies and programs is the Minne-
apolis Urban Coalition. Patterned after the national Urban Coalition, the 
Minneapolis_organization consists of approximately seventy business, labor, 
church, service agency, education, civil rights, minority and poor repre-
sentatives joined to attack poverty and raciRl problems in the community. 
The organization has its own full-time staff and is regarded as a very 
powerful and influential force which directs its efforts toward removing 
the deeply rooted potential causes of racial disorder. Funding is by 
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donations of money and staff by individual businesses. Indian representa-
tives are members of the Coalition. 
The Minn~apolis Urban League, founded in 1925, is a social· 
service, planning and community organization agency established to promote 
interracial efforts and to develop civic leadership to solve problems of 
minority people in housing, education, employment, health and welfare. 
Projects have included job development and placement, on-the-job training 
programs, a Labor Education Advancement Program (LEAP) to involve minority 
youths in building trades apprenticeship programs, minority sensitivity 
training for employers, minority teacher recruiting for the Minneapolis 
Public Schools, counseling and referral for individuals and families, and 
consultation with business, trade groups and government agencies on housing 
and other minority problems. The United Fund, private donations, and USDL 
have been sources of funding. 
The Minneapolis chapter of the National Alliance of Businessmen 
seeks to provide summer and permanent jobs for youth and hard-core unemployed 
persons. Funds are provided by USDL and the organization is partly staffed 
by executives on loan from their corporations. There are Indian staff 
members. The Metropolitan Employers Voluntary Plans for Progress Council 
is an organization of metropolitan area firms formed to promote affirmative 
action in equal employment, training and upgrading. 
There are three exclusively Indian anti-poverty programs funded 
by MOER. 
The Southside American Indian Youth Center and the North Side 
American Indian Teen Center are storefront recreational "drop-ins" for 
inner-city Indian teenagers. Both employ full-time adult directors. The 
North Side Center is governed by a Teen Council, an Adult Board composed of 
parents, and an Advisory Board made up of businessmen and interested local 
residents. It was originally formed by a group of young Indians who broke 
away from the Upper l1idwest American Indian Center as a protest that their 
needs had been overlooked. 12 According to the funding proposal for the 
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North Side Teen Center, it functions to "provide an opportunity for the 
Ind~an young people to develop individual and group identity, to practice 
leadership, to lear~ to accept responsibility in making decisions, to give 
Indian teens the confidence to participate actively in the broader society." 
Besides serving as a pool hall and a 11drop-in" center for Indian youth, the 
organization has sponsored such activities and projects as being the host 
organization for a "little city hall" run by the Minneapolis Police Depart-
ment to improve its community relations, constructing a canoe, conducting 
beadwork classes, showing movies secured through the University of Minnesota, 
sponsoring a hayride, and attending ballgames and pow,;.;rows as a group. OEO 
funds are provided through Pilot City Center. At this writing, the governing 
body of Pilot City Center had raised some questions about the administration 
of the Teen Center, and the Teen Center's Adult Board had voted to withdraw 
from Pilot City and seek funding directly from MOER. 
The South Side American Indian Teen Center is governed by a Teen 
Council, and it serves as a "drop-in" center and pool hall for Indian youth. 
Activities have included tutorial services provided in cooperation with the 
University of Minnesota, Indian history and culture classes, and art classes. 
Funding is by OEO through MOER. 
Besides being hampered by relatively low levels of funding, the teen 
centers have never quite fulfilled their potential as educational out-stations 
for Indian dropouts and other alienated Indian youth. Cooperative efforts 
with the Minneapolis Public Schools and the University of Minnesota have oc-
curred, but the interest and involvement of Indian youth has been difficult to 
sustain-over time. One problem has been that some Indian militants who visit 
the centers counsel Indian young people to quit school and abandon education 
in favor of employment. Another difficulty is that the teen centers, in the 
view of some observers, sometimes become caught in a web of conflict with and 
between the Indian adults who staff the centers, sit on advisory boards, and 
in other capacities attempt to articulate with these relatively new urban 
Indian organizations. The status and income opportunities presented by the 
teen centers sometimes give rise to inter-personal and inter-group conflicts 
within the community of Indian adults, and it is difficult to prevent these 
conflicts from affecting the operation of the centers. 13 
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At the same time, the very existence of two Indian teen centers 
in Minneapolis suggests that many members of the Indian community attach 
considerable importance to the well-being and development of Indian youth. 
That is indeed so~ Members of the white community are often unaware of the 
severe problems of Indian youth, since Indian young people live in out-of-
sight inner-city ghettoes and do not trouble suburbanites; however, Indian 
adults are aware of the problems, including drinking, drugs, and sex. (One 
recent survey of one hundred inner-city Indian adults in Minneapolis, for 
example, asked the respondents to react to this statement: "Too many young 
people in this neighborhood get into difficulties with sex and drinking." 
Fifty percent of the Indian respondents agreed, another thirty-six percent 
14 
were undecided, and only fourteen percent disagreed.) But seldom are they 
willing to discuss these problems in public or with the Indian young people 
themselves. 15 Indeed, Indian adults often give the impression that they 
hope their young people may be able to lead the way in establishing an urban 
16 Indian identity, and adequate funding of such activities is therefore 
important to them: 
These concerned Indians see a certain irony in the 
fact that the white estP.bl.ishment has responded ... with 
money and programs for black youths who have given 
vent to their alienation and bitterness through verbal 
hostility and, sometimes, destruction of property. All 
the while -- with little notice and consequently: 
lesser response -- Indian youths have been quietly and 
tragically destroying not property, but themselves. 17 
The Upper Midwest American Indian Center was originated. in 
July, 1961 and was initially supported by dues, donations and social fund-
raising events sponsored by members. For a time, the Center operated with 
OEO funds and, in July, 1969, it became a United Fund agency. The Center's 
Board of Directors consists of twenty-four Indian members and six non-Indian 
members. About half of the members come from the inner city of Minneapolis 
and the rest from the Greater Minneapolis area. The Center's goals are: 
1. To promote the affiliation of all American 
Indians and their non-Indian friends into a 
non-political and non-sectarian educational, 
civic and cultural organization; 
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2. To promote fellowship among American Indians 
of all tribes and to create bonds of under-
standing between Indians and non-Indians; 
3 •. To assist interested Indians and their families 
in relating to the modern urban social structure; 
4. To foster the educational and economic advance-
ment of the American Indian people; 
S. To encourage artistic and avocational pursuits 
by American Indian people; 
6. To preserve and foster American Indian arts, 
crafts and cultural values. 
The Center provides information and referral services to help 
Indian families just arriving in the Twin City metropolitan area to find 
employment and ~ousing. It operates an Indian Guest House, which serves 
as a rehabilitation center for Indian men who have problems with alcoholism. 
It administers a scholarship fund used to pay for coaching, to buy uniforms 
and athletic equipment for Indian youth, to pay for music and dancing lessons 
for Indian children, and to pay for incidental fees for Indian children. 
Finally, ··the Center provides temporary housing for Indian families coming 
into the Twin City area for the first time by operating two Newcomer Centers, 
houses on the near-north and south sides of Minneapolis. 
Project STAIRS, although funded as an anti-poverty program with 
OEO funds from MOER, will be discussed in another report as an Indian 
education program. Indian Upward Bound, another exclusively Indian educa-
tion program- funded with money from USOE directly, will also be described 
at that point. 
Other Indian organizations in Minneapolis have arisen largely 
around social and political interests. Usually operating with very little 
funding, they are not anti-poverty organizations, yet their support is 
sometimes sought and obtained on issues involving urban Indians and the 
poverty program. Acting either independently or through the Urban American 
Indian Federation, they are increasingly able to articulate the views of 
numerous urban Indians who have formed voluntary associations. Among these 
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organizations are the City-Wide Indian AFDC Mothers, Concerned Indian 
Citizens, Inc., American Indian Advancement, the Twin Cities Tribal 
Council, the Concerned American Indian Citizens of Minneapolis, the 
Broken Arrow Guild, the Sioux Council, the American Indian Student 
Association at the University of Minnesota, and the Minneapolis Indian 
Dance Club. 
Although not strictly an Indian anti-poverty agency, since it 
is funded by private sources, the independent American Indian Movement 
(AIM) must be described here because its militant stance on matters 
concerning anti-poverty programs is important. A chronology of AIM 
activities during the first year or so of its life may help to describe 
the nature of the organization. 
Funded in July, 1968, the organization immediately established a 
committee to collect facts on the number of Indians employed in the city, 
especially by the city, school, county and anti-poverty agencies. Part of 
the rationale for the new group was to eliminate organizational fragmenta-
tion which was characteristic of the Minneapolis Indian community and which 
hampered Indian representation on various boards and agencies. It was 
acknowledged that attempts to form pan-Indian coalitions had failed in 
Minneapolis before due to lethargy, infighting and jealousies, poor planning 
and lack of publicity. 18 The response of the white community to the 
formation of AIM was immediate: an AIM representative was appointed to 
the Minneapolis Capital Long-Range Improvement Committee on the following 
19 day. Shortly thereafter, AIM reported that, based upon an estimate of 
twenty-four thousand blacks and ten thousand Indians in the area, there 
should be approximately one Indian per two clack persons ·eiilployed in the 
city government and anti-poverty programs. The Indian organization also 
concluded that Indian employment fell far below that ratio, that only one 
Indian was employed at a salary of more that five thousand dollars per year, 
and that there were no Indians on the administrative staffs of the city 
20 government and poverty programs. At the same time, AIM leveled its·first 
specific charges of employment discrimination against Indians at TCOIC, 
the black-dominated employability development agency in Minneapolis. 21 
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Establishment of an "Indian Patrol" to prevent alleged police 
harassment of Indian residents along Franklin Avenue on the south side of 
Minneapolis was the next AIM move, and AIM members asserted that Indian 
complaints were being sluggishly handled by the Minneapolis Department of 
Civil Rights. 22 AIM spokesmen declared the patrol a success, but reiterated 
23 
charges of discrimination by organizations funded through OEO. Racial 
conflicts became apparent as an AIM spokesman was quoted as saying: "We 
don't want to fight the OEO, but we ought to start calling it a black OEO 
and quit deceiving the Indian population and the poor whites. Neither is 
being reached by their funds now. As far as we're concerned, it is a black 
movement. The thing we need to do now is find other means to finance 
ourselves. 1124 
Discrimination charges were filed by AIM with the Minneapolis 
Department of Civil Rights against the Minneapolis Tribune for an allegedly 
25 derogatory cartoon. AIM members took an active part in charging a 
Minneapolis patrolman with simple assault in connection with the alleged 
26 beating of a sixteen-year old Indian youth, but the patrolman was sub-
27 
sequently acquitted. City Hall was picketed by AIM members to protest 
the decision and to complain that the Minneapolis Department of Civil Rights 
had not acted on six complaints against police officers accused of beating 
Indians. 28 
An AIM complaint that the moderate Indian staff members of the 
29 Southside Citizen's Community Center were ineffective was to lead to the 
eventual designation of the Southside Center as an Indian Citizens' Com-
munity Center and AIM representation on the staff and board of the Center. 
Support for six AI~1 projects was received from a newly revitalized Urban 
American Indian Federation of Minnesota -- a federation of twenty-three 
Twin Cities Indian organizations -- in the form of a vote of confidence. 
The projects were: a call for more volunteers for AIM's Indian street 
patrol and a request for financial support from the Urban Coalition; joint 
seeking of funds for an Indian center; support for an Indian Citizens' 
Community Center; seeking United Fund support for centers for Indian teen-
agers in north and south Minneapolis; seeking a pledge from the National 
Alliance of Businessmen for two hundred jobs for Indian youth; and asking 
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the United States Department of Justice to investigate Indian complaints 
against the Minneapolis Police Department, as filed with the city Department 
of Civil Rights. 30 
Arrest of the AIM chairman on a charge of obstructing arrest was 
followed by a formal complaint of police brutality in the arrest being filed 
31 
with the Minneapolis Civil Rights Deparment. Negative relations between 
some members of the Indian community and the Minneapolis Police Department 
reached an ugly peak in an Arn-sponsored meeting called to canfront the 
Minneapolis police chief with charges of brutality and harassment of Indians 
on the south side. 32 The police officer who had arrested the AIM chairman 
33 
was formally charged with simple assault in the arrest, but soon after-
wards the chairman was again arrested for alleged traffic violations. 34 
Worsening relations with the police department prompted a formal AIM 
request to the Urban Coalition fqr funding for- -the Indian street patrol; . 
at the same time, AIM requested that five "token Indians" be removed from 
the Urban Coalition because of non-attendance at meetings and be replaced 
35 by active Indian representatives. 
Charges that blacks were discriminating against Indians in the 
Concentrated Employment Program were made by a group of Indian CEP employees 
not identified with AIM. An Indian spokesman was quoted as saying that 
"We have been subjected to intimidation and verbal abuse, particularly about 
our culture and Indian heritage, of which we are very proud." He charged 
that blacks had taken over the program and that Indians were badly under-
represented in policy-making and administrative positions. 36 This prompted 
an investigation of the CEP program by the Urban American Indian Federation. 
The Federation secretary stated that "Indians are being more or less left 
out and pushed to the bottom •••• When they [CEP] have meetings, Indians 
37 are always shouted down and sometimes are threatened verbally." Later, 
AIM proposed to the Urban American Indian Federation a boycott by Minneapolis 
Indians of federally-funded anti-poverty programs in Hennepin County. The 
AIM chairman explained that such action was calculated to cut off federal 
funds from the projects because of a requirement that all minority groups 
be represented in anti-poverty agencies. A regional OEO official disagreed, 
and the Hennepin County Community Action Program Director suggested that 
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Indians should be careful about making charges of discrimination because 
most of the Indian-oriented organizations had all-Indian boards of directors 
38 
while other agencies usually had racially mixed boards. Pressure on the 
CEP program by AIM· and other Indian conununity representatives apparently 
convinced regional OEO officials, who released a report stating that Indians 
were discriminated against by black employees of the program. Minneapolis 
CEP officials said the allegation was untrue. 39 
In the meantime, the AIM chairman had been arrested again for 
alleged robbery40 and once again on charges of drunken driving. 41 A Minnea-
polis police officer was charged by an AIM member with discrimination in 
42 furnishing public services, but the charge was later dismissed. Later, 
AIM representatives succeeded in getting the Urban Coalition to appoint a 
committee to meet with the Minneapolis mayor to !!support efforts to rid 
the police force of its racist elements."1143 
AIM representatives recommended that the new guidelines being 
drawn up for the Department of Indian Work of the Minnesota Council of 
Churches provide the following: (1) that the entire staff of the Department 
be Indian; (2) that a personnel committee -- rather than the Director --
screen and recruit staff to ensure that staff members were chosen who would 
fairly represent the Indian community; (3) that the churches employ their 
influence as an organized body in meeting the urgent need for adequate 
housing for Indian people; and (4) that the churches assume a positive role 
44 in influencing legislation created or supported by Indian people. 
Not all of AIM's abrasiveness has been directed toward the white 
and black communities. A particularly bitter feud developed between AIM 
and members of the Upper Midwest American Indian Center. Several UMAIC 
members were displaced from their jobs at the OEO-funded Southside Citizens' 
Community Center by AIM militants. Subsequently, UMAIC was given support 
by the Minneapolis United Fund in its application for membership and for a 
project to develop a comprehensive Indian center in the Model City area of 
south Minneapolis. Development of such a center had long been discussed 
45 
and had been recommended in special studies by white organizations and 
had been supported by newspaper editorials. 46 The effect of the United Fund 
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support was to make possible funds through Model City in addition to those 
47 provided by the United Fund. The UMAIC promptly appointed a director 
48 for the proposed center. But three AIM members of the United Fund's 
Urban Committee decided to withhold active participation in the committee 
because they did not like the choice of UMAIC to develop the Indian center. 
According to the AIM committee members, UMAIC was generally unpopular with 
inner-city Indians, it had failed to involve the total Indian community in 
plans for the center, it had a board of directors which was white-dominated, 
and it had appointed a director for the new center as a result of a "secret" 
agreement with the United Fund. 49 AIM members succeeded in persuading Model 
City officials to withhold Indian center funds from UMAIC until a new and 
more representative board of directors was elected. According to one AIM 
representative, the UMAIC board contained "too many whites, Indians married 
to whites, and Indians from the suburbs. 1150 UMAIC members bitterly retorted 
that AIM representatives failed to show up for meetings called to resolve 
grievances and that AIM was asked to nominate persons to serve on the UMAIC 
board but did not respond. 51 Rather than interfere in the AIM-UMAIC dispute, 
a United Fund connnittee voted to ask AIM to submit proposals for its own 
admission to United Fund membership. 52 AIM submitted its own center 
proposal for Model City funding, ·and the dispute between the two Indian 
organizations hardened. At this juncture, the Urban.American. Indian 
Federation entered with its own proposal for a center, intended as a 
compromise effort. AIM resigned from the Federation, its members·angry 
over being consistently outvoted at Federation meetings. 53 At this writing, 
the Indian center controversy had not been resolved and Model City funds 
had not been allocated. 
The New Urban Chiefs 
Minneapolis Indian professionals and quasi-professionals tend to be 
in their 20's or early 30's. In the case of the professionals, they are 
people with at least a high school diploma, and more often than not, they· 
have some years of college or a college degree. In two or three isolated 
cases, they are people with work past the bachelor's degree. The quasi-
professionals, who may be employed in positions very much like those of the 
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professionals, are without any college work, but most of them do have a 
high school diploma. 
Both the professionals and the quasi-professionals tend to be 
employed in programs that have sprung up since the Economic Opportunity 
Act of 1964. It occasionally develops that persons who are quasi-profes-
sional actually occupy higher status positions and earn more money than 
those who are legitimately professionals, according to the prevailing 
standards. But both categories of young Indian men are able to work in 
relatively high-paying and high-status jobs because the requirements of 
those jobs have been altered, or because new jobs without very specific 
requirements (but related to the urban Indian population) have come into 
being. 
These young Indian men are thus employed mainly in the poverty 
program area, and they are largely men who are comparatively articulate 
and socially skilled, particularly within bureaucratic frameworks. There 
are exceptions in the case of the quasi-professionals: these young men are 
often not very articulate, and are usually hard-pressed to function in a 
bureaucratic setting. They tend to be controlled by the professionals, 
although control shifts take place as personality and factional matters 
affect each case of II friendship". 
There is a second way in which professional and quasi-professional 
Indians have achieved status in Minneapolis. For some of these Indians, 
access to the news media is a weekly or bi-weekly occurrence. Indeed, the 
news media often compete in seeking these people out for their judgments 
about the nature and meaning of some matter related to Indian life. The 
audiences for the professional and quasi-professional Indians who are 
catered to by the mass media tend to be largely white and middle-class, on 
the one hand, and largely blue-collar and Indian on the other. The chief 
impact of the information and opinions given to the media by the professional 
and quasi-professional Indians is made upon certain elements within the 
white middle-class. For the most part, the media languaRe of these Indians 
goes over the heads of the Indian blue-collar people, and is probably not 
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often heard by more distressed Minneapolis Indians. Thus, the major Indian 
population element which critiques urban Indian action programs in Minne-
apolis is the professional and quasi-professional Indian category, and it 
is the source of the new urban Chiefs. 
"Chiefing" is the process of assuming a non-existent Indian leader-
ship role for the benefit of whites, the self, and select cronies. No one 
can successfuly "chief" in the urban setting without the approving response 
of whites. Originally, the development of Chiefs among the (now) Minnesota 
Chippewa had been stimulated by the requirements of the fur trade and the 
necessity of dealing with the government of the whites. Trader and 
government officials alike preferred to deal with entire social groups 
through as few persons as possible, so that a "leadership'' was developed 
suitable for dealing with outsiders of importance to the Chippewa people. 
But such "leadership" was very uncommon to the Chippewa indeed, for their 
leadership patterns were traditionally based upon the temporary takeover 
of the group by an individual for a specific purpose. After that purpose 
was no longer present, the "leader" disappeared back into the group as an 
equal. The original emergence of a "p.ermanent leadership" was therefore 
an artifact of white economic control and influence, and not the result of 
any "natural" developments within Chippewa tribal culture itself. Typically, 
these Minnesota Indian people have been a rural poverty population, living 
in enclaves surrounded by insensitive and largely exploitative non-Indians. 
Indian "leadership" has typically been able to do little toward alleviating 
the problems of reservation Chippewa, in large part because this leadership 
is usually not representative of the interests of the people, and is more 
directly responsive to the demands of interlocutory roles with white 
agencies. 
In reservation politics and in the case of the urban poverty program 
interlocuters, neither group really "leads" any Indians, if one assumes that 
leadership means a following of persons willing to be led to specific goals 
through actions carried out by persons of their choice, and over whom they· 
have significant control. Reservation "leaders" usually lead no one and 
are not structured personally or socially to do so. 
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Chiefing professionals and quasi-professionals have sporadic fol-
lowings among Minneapolis Indian young, but gather their important responses 
from urban white middle-class people and persons in executive anti-poverty 
positions. They have two distinct advantages over their reservation counter-
parts: they tend to operate in formal structures with minimum mechanisms 
to dethrone them; and they depend even less than reservation leaders upon 
Indian understanding and followership in order to persist and thrive. 
Responses of Chiefs to Indian Programs 
There are six types of responses that seem to typify the reactions 
of the professional and quasi-professional Indian Chiefs to Indian research 
and action programs carried out in Minneapolis. 
(1) In~ifference (approving). This response is reserved for 
programs which validate largely mythological notions about 
contemporary urban Indian life. Chiefing professionals and 
quasi-professionals often promote such myths, which permit 
them to thrive without significant critical response by 
Indians or important whites. 
(2) Backstage put-down. Attempts to discredit action program 
personnel are usually not troublesome for any lasting period 
of time with other Indians, but are often lastingly effective 
with white persons. The range of backstage put-do~ms can 
run from idle cocktail party gossip to letters requesting 
dismissal of the offenders. 
(3) Public criticism of the program as program. The least problem-:,, , 
atic of the six response categories. Usually, the Chief's 
knowledge of programmatic research or action assumptions and 
techniques is minimal. Their critical response to the impli-
cations of research findings and recommendations is almost 
entirely based upon the threat to their roles as interlocutors 
between "the Indian community" and the 11majority society". 
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(4) Public character assassination attempts. Of these responses, 
many take the form of open challenges at public meetings, 
statements in newspaper articles, letters to editors, or 
remarks on radio and television. Again, their lasting impact 
is mostly upon whites. 
(5) Careful use of current Indian mythology to sway opinion. 
Here, the professional or quasi-professional Chief interested 
in preserving his interests from the eroding effects of al-
ternative viewpoints can sway both Indian people and whites 
(but again, particularly the latter) by appealing to "history" 
to explain why unwanted points of view must be wrong. The 
general tenor of these manipulations takes the form of a 
romantic, idealized Indian image-construction based upon a 
threadbare Noble Savage theme. The technique can have 
important negative effects on whites confused over whether 
"Indians really should change" or whether "Indians really 
have changed. " 
(6) Contrived role of the "battered Indian". This is a "put-on" 
role, especially effective on television and in newspaper mug 
shots. In this instance, the urban Chief assumes the role of 
the hurt, confused, and simple_ Indian person beset by whites 
who are attempting to meddle with his "identity as an Indian". 
The technique is also useful in closed meetings, or on intimate 
radio broadcasts. It serves to make the offending point of 
view appear callous and indifferent to the effects of its 
promulgation upon individual Indian psyches. 
Indian-oriented development and research programs in Minneapolis 
have had the following general effects related to the existence and condition 
of urban Chiefs. 
(1) Research and action programs put more people on the 
scene who were potential aauthciiities" on urban Indians. 
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(2) The research often came up with findings which were not the 
kind the Chiefs could appreciate. Their public standpoint 
on the condition of the Indian and his relationship to the 
surrounding urban society was often jeopardized. 
(3) Certain public information roles which had fallen entirely 
to the Chiefs, such as newspaper and radio and television 
analyses of the Indian scene, underwent shaking and erosion. 
(4) A dialogue within the Indian community began, sometimes 
resulting in less than favorable reflections cast upon 
previously unscathed Chiefs. 
(5) Relationships with certain white power interests with whom 
the Chiefs had been working, and upon whom they depended, 
began:,to show signs of erosion. 
(6) The Chiefs began to suffer some relationary and power 
changes within their own group. 
The Chiefs have generally countereµ these problems effectively. Their 
main weapons have already been outlined, but these are applied chiefly 
against whites. A more potent weapon is employed to keep the Indian 
population in line. We shall deal with it now, and reflect upon its 
implications for future trends in urban Indian social relations. 
Control of the. Indian Image 
The dualistic sort of imagery that the Chiefs project of both 
urban and rural Indians has the following general romantic elements: Indian 
people are more "human" and "sensitive" than whites, and they have a "better 
value system" than whites, primarily because they do not subscribe to the 
middle-class patterns of consumption and display, or to certain other 
Protestant Ethic elements. On the other hand, the Chiefs insist upon 
presenting Indians as a cynical, discouraged people wrongfully treated by 
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contemporary as well as historical white influences~ a people who are 
justified in continuing to allow their cynicism and defeat to influence 
their responses to the mechanisms of white society. 
The Chiefs actively suggest that for most Indians to remain 
essentially poor, powerless and without confidence is virtuous, because 
they have been wrongly treated. The further implication, "Once a white, 
always a white", is clearly present. There is little room for change 
within a perspective of such dualism. There is the continuation of the 
guilt of the white and the hurt of wronged and resentful. Indian. 
Such a contrived impasse cries. for "explanation" and allows the 
interlocutor Chief to develop his role as spokesman for the Indian 
community and interlocutor for the whites. It also allows him to become 
economically advantaged. It discourages the development of indigenous 
leadership to challenge the chiefing role, and it places an automatic 
intellectual and moral stricture on any white or Indian who would attempt 
to redefine the intercultural situation: 
Agency Treatment by Urban Chiefs 
The Chiefs have assumed the additional role of baiting many Minne-
apolis social service agencies in a general kind of way, usually around 
the notions of ''bureaucratic insensitivity" and "racism''. But they do not 
provide, in any sense, alternative practical guidelines or goals for the 
agencies that would allow the agencies to improve their Indian-related 
functions through altered philosophies and programs. For example, a 
schoolteacher may publicly cry out in a spasm of emotion that she has 
discovered her "true" white racist qualities, but the typical Chief response 
to this declaration is likely to be anxiety, and the rough suggestion that 
the teacher "has done her thing" for her own "kicks". The Chief usually 
continues that such revelation on the part of whites can never lead to 
change, since 11only Indians can help Indians". The Chiefs rarely mention 
the fact that many Minneapolis agencies have active Indian recruitment 
programs underway, but are either unable to find Indian employees even 
-23-
when agency standards are revised, or are unable to retain Indian employees 
once they are brought aboard. 
Agencies 'do need to change. The often recognize it, but they do 
not know how. In this regard, they get little if any help from status-
anxious Indian "leaders" in the chiefing role. An Indian red power advocate 
recently assailed the city welfare agency for requiring too much paperwork 
of Indian clients, but he did not offer any alternative to the information-
gathering and client-processing techniques currently an aspect of the 
welfare processing mechanisms. This lack of alternatives to existing and 
often cumbersome and degrading techniques is a major factor in the continued 
employment of these methods by agencies, and a major factor in the continued 
employment of entrepreneurial Chiefs as public critics. 
To· the "chiefing" Indian poverty professional or quasi-professional, 
who is actually conducting Indian projects in Minneapolis? All the 
"wrongn people -- whites building academic careers on the backs of Indian 
respondents, and duped Indian sell-outs playing patsies to some variant on 
white neo-colonialism. Who is perceived to legitimately conduct Indian 
urban research? No one -- unless that research is engaged in by persons 
from whom no threat bodes in findings, or implications from findings or·,dn 
disagreement with a carefully structured tribal alienate/noble savage 
dualistic image of the Indian. Who would be most desirable performing in 
urban Indian research and action roles? The Indian poverty Chiefs them-.:: 
selves, of course. Some Chiefs hint publicly at the many profound "findings 1 
that have become known to them through their roles as Indian historians, 
ethnographers, philosophers, authors, programmers, religious leaders, and 
guardians of Indian interests. 
Employing recent research findings as a basis, and working within 
the interests of Minneapolis Indian people not in the chiefing group, severa} 
Indian education programs have been developed and funded by local and 
national government agencies. Because these programs require staffs and 
boards, and because they have money to spend, they provide an immediate 
threat to the security of the Chiefs. One major education program recently 
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funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity was under constant fire by 
entrepreneurial Chiefs who. saw it as a direct attack upon their livelihoods. 
Prior to that, the research which led to the development of a proposal to 
the Office of Economic Opportunity was publicly and privately discredited. 
With that large education program beginning to roll into operation in 
1969-1970 under the directorship of an all-Indian board, the Chiefs called 
for a boycott of the program and prepared counter-proposals to the same 
agency for roughly identical services to the Indian population. Certainly, 
this kind of competition is not atypical within cities where competing 
groups vie intra-ethnically for limited anti-poverty funds. But in this 
instance, the intentions of the Minneapolis Chiefs were privately stated 
as obstructionary, not as attempts to gain additional educational and 
related services for the Indian community. These Chiefs have been "on 
record", in private discussions, as being in favor of no Indian programs 
at all. The destruction of threatening white and Indian counterparts to 
the role of interlocutor and entrepreneur has been and is being attempted. 
Control of the Indian 
Retaliations like program blockage are effective only if the tactics 
are suitable. So far, the Minneapolis Chiefs have employed a singularly 
deadly approach to control of the Indian population. The federal education 
program which many working-class Indian adults helped to develop was 
structured around the notion that Indians can develop, run, and critique 
their own programs , .... ~rt-~ ... thRt. they need not lose their "Indianness" in the 
process. Accordingly, a very persistent theme in the defensive propaganda 
of the Chiefs is that any change on the part of a participating Indian 
person and the specifics are never made clear -- means that that person 
is either less Indian, or no longer Indian at all. For many urban Indians, 
especially the Minneapolis Chippewa young people, identity crises are the 
major problem of life. To be told that participation in a special education 
program signifies a loss of 11Indianness" is to be told something not only 
unsettling but often terrifying. The Chiefs are aware of the strong 
adaptive and acculturative influences playing on Minneapolis Indians, and 
of the often confused, ambivalent, and defensive responses to them. Their 
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strategic use of such factors to insure a perpetual Indian separation from 
major urban institutions and agencies is thus practical and intelligent, as 
well as cynical and manipulative. 
So far, there is no defense against the dualistic image strategy. 
The moral and policy questions for white professionals aware of the problem 
and involved in its ~day-to-day dynamics are great. Indeed, the temptation 
is constantly present to intervene drastically, perhaps by discrediting the 
Chiefs personally and publicly. But the battle is not really between 
professional whites and Chiefs so much as it is between rival philosophies 
of connnunity development, and among Indians themselves. Under the philosophy 
we have accepted and related here, white professionals must almost uniformly 
play the role of hired technician to action programs,* or that of "objective0 
(i.e., prudent) researcher, and leave chiefing and the problems related to 
it where they ethnically and morally belong -- in the collective hands of 
the Indian people themselves. 
What are some of the consequences of anti-poverty programs and 
Indian militancy, especially when Chiefs are involved, upon urban Indians 
in Minneapolis? 
* 
(1) Many reservation Indians who have migrated to Minneapolis lack 
the experience and the formal requirements, such as education, 
to obtain psychologically and economically rewarding employ-
54 ment. Some of thesB0 urban Indians see anti-poverty programs 
as one of the few available sources of good jobs and power, and 
the development of a militant Indian organization (AIM) in 
_Minneapolis can be traced directly to a desire for a fair 
share of anti-poverty program employment and influence. 
(2) To get a larger share of the jobs and benefits available in 
anti-poverty programs, Indian militants have developed and 
utilized confrontation and "demand" tactics. Such behavior 
This report is a partial exception to that rule. 
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is very disturbing to many other urban Indians. Indeed, Indian 
militants in Minneapolis often are criticized by other Indians 
for being "Afro-Indians" and for engaging in tactics said to be 
"not the Indian way. 1155 
(3) Part of the development of Indian militancy in Minneapolis 
probably is due to the aggressive pursuit of jobs and program 
control by blacks, which necessitates some sort of competitive 
behavior by Indians in order to secure a share of anti-poverty 
resources. Thus, conflicts between inner-city minority popula-
tions, as in the Minneapolis CEP program, can be intensified 
by the operation of anti-poverty programs. To the dismay of 
Minneapolis anti-poverty strategists, programs have sometimes 
operated to "divide and conquer"~. the end result has been 
diminished community organization in disadvantaged areas. 
Indians in Minneapolis anti-poverty programs tend to respond 
as Indians and not as members of a larger disadvantaged class. 
(4) Probably because of the .. long history of unsatisfactory and even 
destructive relationships with federal policies and programs 
in particular and white domination in general, most Minneapolis 
urban Indians are not actively involved in anti-poverty 
programs, and many even doubt the reality of Indian-controlled 
and Indian-operated programs. The cynical commentary, "It's 
just another Federal program", reflects an attitude of long-
standing popularity in the Indian community and does much to 
prevent many Indian people from becoming implicated in new 
programs. Reaching the apathetic, the distrustful, and the 
doubtful constitutes the most difficult challenge for Indian 
leaders in Minneapolis who are concerned with mobilizing 
Indian community support for, and participation in, Indian 
ventures. 
-27-
(5) Anti-poverty and militant Indian organizations in Minneapolis 
have provided a forum for the development of Indian activists 
and SP.okesmen. 56 Indian militancy in particular .. has been con-
sistently rewarded by local press attention. The public 
dramatization of the plight of urban Indians in Minneapolis 
undoubtedly has resulted in many gains for Indians, such as 
representation on boards and commissions; employment in·govern-
ment, poverty programs, and industry; and funding of exclusively 
Indian organizations. Public attention has given the Indian 
male a voice and an opportunity to begin working out an urban 
Indian identity. 
(6) There have been drawbacks, however. Minneapolis Indian spokesmen 
have articulated well the inequities and injustices suffered by 
Indian people in the past and in the urban setting today, and 
they have demanded what they consider to be just treatment from 
whites and blacks. "Just treatment" includes freedom from what 
Indians say is police harassment, it involves the elimination 
of negative image-building material from advertising and text-
books, and it means economic improvement often with the ',., 
implication of an indemnity for past wrongs suffered at the 
hands of white society. Failure to gain an appropriate response 
to these needs -- especially economic needs -- results in 
alienation from the 11system" and, in Minneapolis, that includes 
the school system. Alienated militants, who see the public 
schools as a vehicle for propagating a way of life destructive 
to Indian interests, have been known to counsel Indian youths 
to drop out of school and get a job instead. Indians with 
college degrees are sometimes labeled "sell-outs". 
In short, what urban Indian spokesmen in Minneapolis protest, what 
they do not like about white-dominated society, and what they propose not 
!Q. do have become increasingly clear to Indians and non-Indians alike. What 
is unclear from the articulation and behavior of Indian spokesmen is what 
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urban Indians propose to do, including the role models for Indian men and 
-- . 
women in urban society considered to be ''Indian" as well as the general 
posture of urban J:ndians on specific issues. What is not ~'the Indian way" 
is clearer than what is "the Indian way" and the activities of Indian 
professionals and quasi-professionals who deliver presentations describing 
"Indian values" drawn from anthropologist's writings about reservation-era 
Indians do little except cloud understanding of what it means to be an 
urban Indian. There is some rhetoric about Indian involvement, Indian 
self-determination, Indian participation, Indian decision-making, and 
Indian competence, but there is a lack of consensus and understanding about 
how to do these things in ways that can be identified as "Indian". Without 
such models, immobilization of the Indian population is an understandable 
condition. Indian-controlled programs in Minneapolis need to be more 
visible to Indians, because they provide the rare opportunity of trying 
out ways of accommodation to the urban environment to see how they work, 
and because what is learned from these programs can be passed on to other 
urban Indians. Part of the lack of positive identity models for the 
Indian community is due to concentration of the mass media on the drama 
of confrontation; Indian professionals in all-Indian programs who advocate 
courses of social action for Indians have difficulty in reaching large 
audiences. 
Perhaps a more important deterrent is the great need for urban 
Indians in Minneapolis to get together and face common problems with a 
view toward developmental steps and to work out mutually supportive ways 
of achieving larger gains for all Indians. The cement of community organi-
zation becomes extremely crucial as a deprived minority faces the difficult 
task of adjustment to urban life without the loss of identity. To that end, 
there may have to be fundamental changes in the nature of Indian political 
processes and decision-making. To expect the rich diversity of opinion 
within the Indian community to evaporate would be unrealistic, but Indians 
may have to develop new ways to resolve differences so that action can be 
taken to seize opportunites. 
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Minneapolis is a city beset with most of today's inner-city ills, 
including inadequate financing, and it is a city which reacted to the 
confrontation tact-ics of a handful of black militants by electing a former 
policeman Mayor on a "law and order" platform. Minneapolis Indians short 
of participation in a violent-revolution -- may be faced with limited 
alternative ways of adapting to urban life with a measure of self-determi-
nation. These alternatives include wresting a larger share of a wilting 
anti-poverty program and participating actively in changing the major insti-
tutions of the city, including the schools, to better accommodate Indians. 
If the latter approach is viewed by Indians as valid, then new pressures 
will develop. Indians will have to learn how to function within predomi-
nantly white organizations; they will have to master the inner workings 
of those organizations; they will have to find allies in the change process 
within these organizations; they will have to exercise internal pressures 
for change; they will have to coordinate their activities with sources of 
outside pressure; they will have to explain their activites to members of 
the Indian community. The development of Indian competence and expertise 
will be a crucial prerequisite to the acquisition and exercise of self-
determination by Indian people in Minneapolis. That development may be 
aided or hampered by educational institutions, and the form and structure 
of Indian education at all age levels may be a critical issue. 
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